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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 





UTAH LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD and UNITED STEEL-
WORKERS OF AMERICA, CIO, 
Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8393 
To supplement appellant's Statement of Facts, the 
respondent adopts Trial Examiner Robert J. Shaugh-
nessy's Intermediate Report, upon which the Utah State 
Labor Board based its Findings of Fact and Order 
(Record, 316) : 
HISTORY OF THE CASE-JURISDICTION 
The Respondent*, Phillip B. Guss, dba Photo Sound 
Manufacturing Company, zs engaged in the manufac-
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tttre of specialized equipment for the United States A.ir 
Force on a contract basis. The amount of these contracts 
with the Govern1nent or it$ agencies totaled $152,025.50. 
On December 1, 1953, the Pf3titioner herein filed a 
Petition (Bd. Exhibit No. 1) for Certification of Rep-
resentatives with the National Labor Relations Board 
involving the employees of the Respondent. Pursuant 
to this Petition, an Agreement for consent election (Bd. 
Exhibit No. 3) was signed, an Election condu.cted on 
April 26, 1954, a. Tally of Ballots issued April 26, 1954 
and q Qertificatiqn of Representativ~s dated May 4, 1954. 
All of the foregQi·ng was handled by and throu9h the 
National Labor E;elations Board, ~Oth 8cgior,~;. 
*At the hearing below Photo Sound Products Manufacturing 
Company (the Appellant herein) is designated as the Respondent, 
and United Steel-Workelis of America, CIO (the R.espondent 
herein) was designated as the Claimant and Petitioner in the 
hearing below. 
After a series of attempts at negotiating a contract 
bJ~ the Petitioner and Respondent, an Unfair Labor 
Practice Charge (Resp. Exhibit No.7) was filed against 
the Respondent by the Petitioner on May 17, 1954. Fol-
lowing the filing of this Charge, t·he Acting Regional 
Director of the 20th Region of the N.L.R.B. issued a 
letter (Comp. Exhibit No. 9) dated July· 21, 1954, in 
which he declared, "Further proceedings are not war-
ranted, inasmuch as the operations of the Company in-
volv~d are predominantly local in character, and it does 
not appear that it would effectuate tke polici·es of the 
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Act to exercise jurisdiction. I am, therefore, refusing 
to issue complaint in this matter." No appeal or other 
proceedings were taken thereafter by either party and 
the decision became final. 
Following this decision, the Petitioner filed charges 
with the Utah Labor Relations Board alleging in sub-
stance the same matters as filed before the N.L.R.B. 
The Petitioner's position is t-hat the refusal of the 
N.L.R.B. to act confers jurisdiction on this Board to 
act. The Respondent's position is that the employer is 
in fact engaged in interstate commerce, subject to the 
N.L.R.B. and by Federal preemption in this field, the 
Utah Labor Relations Board cannot act. 
It must be conceded that the Respondent is manu-
facturing products almost all of which are shipped out-
side the State of Utah. It is also true that a large amount 
of the dollars expended in performing these contracts 
are spent for labor. and the purchase of materials on a 
local level. It is thus apparent that intrastate commerce 
as well as interstate commerce is affected by this dispute. 
It is important that consideration must be given to 
the ract that in the original representation proceeding 
the Certification was issued on the basis of a "consent 
Election." In this proceeding there was no administra-
tive or judicial determination by the N.L.R.B. or its 
agents that the Respondent's operation was sufficient 
to warrant the N.L.R.B. to assume jurisdiction. The 
parties merely agreed that they were subject to the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
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Pursuant to the filing of the Unfair Labor Practice 
Charge by the Co·mplainant before the N.L.R.B., the 
fi'rst expression of a.dministrative determination of the 
question of jurisdiction occurred when the Regional 
Director of the N.L.R.B. stated ... "the operations of 
the Company involved are predominately local in char-
acter, and it does not appear that it would effectuate 
the policies of the Act to exercise jurisdiction." It ap-
pears that here we have an expression by a lack of juris-
diction on the part of the N.L.R.B. and such expression 
became final when no appeal was taken. The N.L.R.B. 
and the parties to this proceeding apparently agreed 
that t·he activities of the Respondent are primarily local 
in character. The Hearing Referee must agree. 
As was stated by our Supreme Court in Utah Labor 
Relations Board vs. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 Pac. 2d 
520: 
"It would seem paradoxical indeed to hold 
as defendant urges us to do, that the hospital 
is beyond the control of the Utah Legislature be-
cause it is controlled by an Act of Congress, 
which by its very terms excludes the hospital 
from its operation." 
As was aptly pointed out by the New York State 
Labor Relations Board in a somewhat similar situation 
in the case of Matter of B.F.O.E. of the United States 
vs. N.Y.S.L.R.B., 17 /::;.L.R.B. 61: 
"Exclusi(, n of organizations such as Respon--
dents from the coverage of the Act: " ... would 
not immunize them from labor disputes, for it 
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would not deprive the employees of the right to 
join a union or to engage in concerted activities. 
The sole effect would be to make unavailable the 
procedures for peaceful adjustments of labor dis-
putes, whic-h the Legislature has provided in the 
Act, and regulate the employees to economic 
action to obtain recognition and negotiations. The 
purpose of the Act is to substitute the peaceful 
procedures provided therein for the economic 
warfare which results from the refusal of em-
ployers engaged in commercial activities to 
negotiate with the representatives of their em-
ployees.'' 
The Hearing Examiner must, therefore, conclude 
that the business of t~he Respondent affects intrastate 
co1nmerce, or the orderly operation of industry within 
the State of Utah, and since the N.L.R.B. has refused 
jurisdiction, therefore the Utah Labor Relations Board 
has jurisdiction. 
THE Ul!·lF AIR LABOR PRACTICES 
1. THE DISCHARGES. 
1. Charles Illsley was employed by the Respondent 
tn October of 1953. The following month he signed a 
union a~tthorization card. He became active immediately 
in promoting the Union among fellow employees. He 
acted as the Union observer at the time of the N.L.R.B. 
election. He later became a member of the Union ne-
gotiating committee and grievance committee. He par-
ticipated in virt~tally all negotiations that were held be-
tween the Company and the Union until negotiations 
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ceased. Illsley was discharged in August 1954 after 
negotiations had broken off and the N.L.R.B. had re-
fused to issue a comp.laint. 
After the advent of the organization campaign it 
seems from all the evidence. that a general attitude of 
anti-union conduct developed on the part of manage-
ment towards the ·infant union. Negotiations were not 
satisfactory. The Respondent failed to give proper at-
tention to the request of the Union for meetings or dis-
cussions on grievances. Since Mr. Illsley was spearhead-
ing the Union movement in all these fields, it follows 
that because of the general anti-union attitude of theRe-
spondent they were most anxious to see him discharged. 
In point of seniority in his classification he w·as t·he 
oldest employee of the Respondent. His successor was 
another employee of the Respondent that did not work 
for Photo Sound but an entirely separate operation that 
the Respondent maintained elsewhere. 
The Referee finds and conc.ludes that Charles Illsley 
was discharged solely because of his activities for and 
on behalf of the complainant Union. 
2. Gary Watrous was employed as a clerk and stock 
record keeper in the production shop and had been so 
emp.loyed since July 15, 1953. Mr. Watrous had attended 
a 1neeting of the Union at which the Respondent's man-
ager, Mr. Garber, spoke. He had 1net in cars outside 
Respondent's place of business with the Union Represen-
tative, Mr. Mullet, and had been observed by Mr. Gar-
ber, who also knew the occupation and purpose of Mr. 
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llf.nllet. After obta-ining permission for a two-week leave 
of absence for active duty with the Navy, the applicant 
found on his return that he had been replaced by some-
one from some other operation carried on by Mr. Guss. 
Prior to his departure for the Navy, Mr. Watrous had 
been questioned by Mr. Gerber as to how he had voted 
in the election. As will later appear, Mr. Gerber was 
known as being opposed to the Union. 
The Referee finds and concludes that Mr. Watrous 
had been discharged for his activities for and on behalf 
of the Union. 
* * * * 
5. Victor Sismondi was employed ~n October of 
1953 and discharged in April of 1954. The management 
of the Respondent advised him that he had been dis-
charged for sloppy work. Apparently a number of valves 
were not properly cut and Sismondi was blamed for this 
error. Sismondi's activities in connection with the Union 
consisted primarily in signing a union designation card 
and distributing cards to other employees. He met with 
the Union Representative on a number of occasions and 
attended meetings with other employees. Hrz~s employ-
ment lasted seven months. It seems difficult to the Re-
feree to employ a 1nachinist for such a period and at 
that tin~e discover that he was not qualified to do the 
job. Such a shortcoming seems reasonab.le to determine 
after a few weeks of employment let alone seven months. 
It would appear that management had knowledge of the 
fact that Sismondi was a member of the Union and at 
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best picked a poor time to discharge him immediately 
prior to the election. 
In consideration of the entire attitude of the Re-
spondent towards the Union in general and to certain of 
the employees who were defin·itely active on behalf of 
the Union, it is the finding of the undersigned that Victor 
Sismondi was discharged for Union activity. 
6. The Union made a claim on behalf of Clisbee 
Lyman, another mem,ber of the Union, that he was dis-
charged for Union activities, but the most that can be 
said for this was the evidence was entirely hearsay and 
none of a substantial nature on which a finding could be 
based. The Trial Examiner concludes that there is no 
ev·idence to support a finding that Clisbee Lyman was 
discharged for activities associated with t·h~e Union. 
7. The Union disclaimed any interest in Max Whit-
man, one of the employees named in the Complaint and 
Charge and therefore the Complaint should be dismissed 
as to him. 
2. THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE RIGHTS OF THE 
EMPLOYEES. 
The record shows from the outset a long series of 
instances by the Respondent or his representatives in 
making statements to individual employees and to the 
employees as a group that tended to interfere with their 
right to make a free choice of their bargaining rep-
resentative. In the fact of this discrimination and in-
timidation of the e1nployees, the employees neverthe-
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less designated the United Steelworkers of America as 
their bargaining agent. 
The Trial Exan~iner must conclude from the ev-
idence submitted that in the face of threats of reprisal 
if the election showed a majority for t·he Union, the 
employees overcame such threats and designated the 
Union as their bargaining representative. Thus the ques-
tion of interference becomes moot. 
3. THE REFUSAL TO BARGAIN. 
Fallowing the Certification by the N.L.R.B. the 
Union requested an immediate meeting for the purpose 
of negotiating a contract. A number of letters and phone 
calls were made, meetings set and cancelled until finally 
an Unfair Labor Practice Charge was filed with the 
N.L.R.B. 
Following this a meeting was held on June 1, 1954 
tn the office of the Respondent's attorney, Peter M. 
B·illings. Mr. Rasmussen, the Union's representative, 
supplied a proposed contract on behalf of the Union and 
represented bhat the matter was open for negotiations. 
Mr. Rasmussen also provided a proposed interim agree-
ment for handling grievances. The matter was discussed 
generally with reference to general matters in the con-
tract. 
Another meetinq was held J1~ne 23, 1954 and at this 
meeting the interim agreement for handling grievances 
was signed. Shortly thereafter, the Respondent's at-
torney left town and did not return until August 11, 1954 
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at which time he found a letter from the Union request-
ing a meeting either the 11th, 12th or 13th of August. 
At the same time, th.e Respondent and his Attorney re-
ceived word from the N.L.R.B. that they would not as-
sume jurisdiction of the u.nfair labor practice charge 
previously filed by the Union. 
In the face of a request for a meeting to negotiate 
the contract by t·he Union on any one of three days, the 
Respondent ignored the request and by Counsel's own 
statement decided ''that the Steelworkers were dropping 
the matter of negotiation, because we had no further 
reqttest." From this time on, in spite of an open request 
for bargaining sessions, the Respondent ·made no furthe:r 
effort to contact either the Steelworker's Union or a 
member of the negotiating committee of Respondent's 
place of business. 
The Trail Examiner can only conclude that after 
the N.L.R.B. decision, the Respondents had no further 
intention of meeting or attempting to negotiate a con-
tract. It must also be found that the request for meet-
ings were reasonable as to number, tim-e and place. For 
these reasons t-h;e record supports a finding that the Re-
spondent has since on or before refused to bargain 
collectively with the duly designated representative of 
their employees. 
The Trial Examiner then recommended, and the 
Utah Labor Relations Board ordered: 
1. Phil S. Guss dba Photo Sound Products Mfg. 
Co. cease and desist from refusing to bargain collectively 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with United Steelworkers of America as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of his employees e1nployed at 
his place of business, 264 East 1st Sout·h, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, in respect to rates of pay, hours of employment 
and other conditions of employ1nent. 
2. Take the following affirmative action which the 
Trial Examiner finds is necessary to effectuate the 
policies of the Act: 
(a) U pan request, bargain collectively with 
United Steelworrkers of America as the exclusive 
bargaining representative of his employees em-
ployed by the Respondent at 264 East 1st South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, in respect to rates of pay, 
hours of employment and other conditions of em-
ployment. 
(b) Upon application, either personally or 
through~ their bargaining representative, immediately 
and fully reinstate Charles Ills ley, Gary Watrous 
and Charles Sismondi to their former positions with 
Respondent held by them prior to the dates of their 
discharge without prejudice to any rights or privi-
leges previously enjoyed by each of them, discharg-
ing, if necessary, any person or persons employed 
in the place of each since their discharge. 
(c) Make whole each of the employees named 
in paragraph (b) above for any loss of wages that 
may have occurred from the time of their discharge 
until they are fully reinstated. Employwr to receive 
11 
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credit for all earnings from all sources during the 
time between the date of their discharge and the 
time of their reinstatement. 
(d) Post i1rl/mediately, in plain sight, and leave 
posted for a per,iod of thirty consecutive days from 
the first day of posting, in a conspicious place in 
Respondent's premises, a copy of the Board's Order 
together with an appropriate notice to its employees 
in a form to be determined by the Board. 
Notwithstanding the Labor Board's mandate, the 
employer ignored the entire order, resting his refusal 
upon the ground the National Labor Relations Board 
has exclusive jurisdiction of his employment activities. 
STATEMENT OF POINT'S 
The question presented here is whether the Utah 
State Labor Relations. Board may take a case affecting 
interstate commerce after the National Labor Relations 
Board has declined to decide the controversy because of 
its jurisdictional policy. 
POINT. I 
RESPONDENTS CONCEDE THERE HAS BEEN NO 
CESSION OF JURISDICTION FROM THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO THE UTAH STATE LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD AS PROVIDED BY SECTION 10 (a), 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947. 
POINT II 
THE UTAH STATE LABOR RELA:TIONS B·OARD 
SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ACT IF THE NATIONAL 
12 
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LABOR RELATIONS BOARD DECLINES TO ASSERT 
JURISDI·CTION. 
POINT III 
UNLESS THE STATE ACTS IN THIS INSTANCE, A 
VACUUM IN THE LAW IS CREATED WHICH MAY RE-
SULT IN ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY BOTH STATE 
AND FEDERAL LAW. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS CONCEDE THERE HAS BEEN NO 
CESSION OF JURISDICTION FROM THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELATIONS BOARD TO 'THE UTAH S'TATE LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD AS PROVIDED BY SECTION lO(a), 
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947. 
Section 10(a), Labor Management Relations Act 
authorizes the National Labor Relations Board to cede 
to any state or territorial agency "jurisdiction over any 
cases in any industry * * * even though such cases may 
involve labor disputes affecting (interstate) commerce 
* * * ." In a 1954 decision the United States Supreme 
Court quoted an N.L.R.B. memorandum filed at the re-
quest of the Sup rente Court: 
"It is not feasible under the limitations pre-
scribed by the Act to consummate ceding agree-
ments to any states under the proviso." 
United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Cor-
poration) 34 7 U.S. 656, ( 1954) Footnote 2. 
The limitations mentioned by the National Labor 
Relations Board involve the fact that no state has copied 
the National Labor Management Relations Act. The 
13 
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re~ult is that state labor relations laws are sufficiently 
inconsistent with the Labor Management Relations Act 
to preclude cessions agreements. The situation men-
tioned in the memorandum remains unchanged. For a 
state board's comments on resultant problems, see the 
discussion of New York Labor Relations Board (1949) 
Annual Report, 26 Labor Relations Reference Manual 
69. 
Respondents, therefore, concede there has been no 
cession of jurisdiction from the National Labor Re-
lations Board to the Utah State Labor Board, and un-
der the circumstances of this case, cession is not neces-
sary. 
POINT II 
THE UT·AH STATE LABOR REL~TIQ.NS BOARD 
SHOULD HAVE THE POWER TO ACT IF THE NATIONAL 
LABOR RELA:TIONS BOARD DECLINES TO ASSERT 
JURIS.DI·GTION. 
The single question presented before this Court for 
decision is whether the Utah State Labor Relations 
Board may take jurisdiction of a labor matter affecting 
interstate commerce when the National Labor Relations 
Board has declined jurisdiction because of budgetary or 
other administrative reasons. The issue is a novel one, 
having never been decided by this tribunal or the United 
States Supreme Court-appellant's authorities to the 
contrary, notwithstanding. In Bethlehem Steel Corpora-
tion v. New York Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767 
( 1946), the United States Supreme Court stated : 
"The election of the National Board to decline 
jurisdiction in certain types of cases, for budget-
14 
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ary or other reasons, presents a different prob-
lem which we do not now decide." (Emphasis 
added.) 
In LaCross Telephone Corporation v. W.E.R.B., 
336 U.S. 18 (1949), the Supreme Court did not pass upon 
the effect of a discretionary declination of jurisdiction 
by the National Board. The court in Gardner v. Team-
sters G & H Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), held there was 
no 
"suggestion that respondents plea of federal 
jurisdiction and pre-emption was frivolous and 
dilatory, or that the federal board would decline 
to exercise its powers once its jurisdiction was 
invoked." 
As recently as 1954, the United States Supreme Court 
in the case of Building Trades Council v. Kinard Con-
struction Co., 346 U.S. 933, held in a per curium decision: 
"Since there has been no clear showing that 
respondent has applied to the National Labor 
Relations Board for appropriate relief, or that 
it would be futile to do so, the court does not 
pass upon the question suggested by the opinion 
below on whether the State court could grant its 
own relief should the Board decline to exercise 
its jurisdiction." 
Since the Kinard holding there have been no deci-
sions by the United States Supreme Court on this point 
and as of this date ihe issue at hand is without a prior 
conclusive precedent. 
Appellant has placed great wejght upon the Bethle. 
hem, LaCross and Garner cases, supra, in support of 
15 
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its position. Those cases involved facts creative of 
potential or direct conflict of state and federal action 
as distinguished from the situation at hand. Explaining 
its denial of the concurrent federal-state jurisdiction 
theory urged by the states in the Bethlehem case, the 
LaCross court held that: 
"the situation [was] too fraught with potential 
conflict to pernrit the intrusion of the state agency 
even though the National Board had not acted in 
the particular cases * • * . [If the National Board 
and a state board take jurisdiction of the same 
labor matter, the] uncertainty as to which board 
is master and how long it will remain such can 
be as disruptive of peace between various in-
dustrial factions as actual competition between 
the two boards for supremacy." 
LaCross Telephone Corp. v. W.E.R.B., supra. 
In the Garner case, supra, it was held that the 
federal board had jurisdiction over the matter in dispute 
because of potential conflict that might otherwise arise 
between the state and federal governments. The court 
stated: 
"To avoid facing a conflict between the state 
and federal remedies, we would have to assume 
either that both authorities will always agree as 
to whether the picketing should continue or that 
the state's temporary injunction will be dissolved 
as soon as the federal board acts. But experience 
gives no assurance of either alternative and there 
is no indication that the statute left it open for 
such conflicts to arise." 
In the Bethlehern, LaCross and Garner cases, supra, 
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and in the case of Plankinton Packing Company v. 
W.E.R.B., 338 U.S. 953, a direct or potential conflict of 
federal and state action was involved, and there was no 
declination of jurisdiction by the federal agency. 
The doctrine of "irreconcilable conflict" was stated 
by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in the case of Kelly v. 
Washington, 302 U.S. 1 (1937), as follows: 
"When Congress does exercise its paramount 
authority, it is obvious that Congress may deter .. 
mine how far its regulation shall go. There is no 
constitutional rule which compels Congress to 
occupy the whole field. Congress may circum .. 
scribe its regulation outside that limited field. 
When it does so, state regulation outside that 
limited field and otherwise admissible is not for-
bidden or displaced. The principle is thoroughly 
established that the exercise by the state of its 
police power, which would be valid if not super .. 
seded by federal action, is superseded only where 
the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and posi-
tive' that the two acts cannot 'be reconciled or 
consistently stand together.' " 
The case before this Court involves neither a poten .. 
tial nor direct and positive conflict of state-federal 
power, and the rationale upon which state jurisdiction 
was denied in the Bethlehem, Garner, LaCross and 
Plo.nkinton cases is inapplicable here. In the February 
1952 issue of Labor Law Journal, Philip Feldblum, 
general counsel for the New York State Labor Relations 
Board, in discussing "jurisdictional Tidelands in Labor 
Relations" states : 
"That rationale [irreconcilable conflict], how .. 
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ever, is inapplicable where the National Board has 
declined to assert jurisdiction. In such situations, 
there are no 'potentalities of conflict.' There can 
be no dual assertion of jurisdiction leading to 
vain action or mischievous conflict and no doubt 
as to which board 'is the master.' Thus, there 
is nothing in the decisions and rationale of the 
Supreme Court which affirmatively bars the ap-
plication of state power to labor disputes over 
which the National Board declines to exercise 
jurisdiction. On the contrary, ce~tain portions 
of the Bethlehem opinion affirmatively indicate 
the propriety of state action where federal power 
is administratively withheld. 
The Supreme Court in the Bethlehem case, 
acknowledged that the field of labor relations 
was not one in which the commerce clause it-
self pre-empted the field and precluded state 
action. It recognized that labor relations tradi-
tionally were matters of local concern and in-
terest, 'until recently' left entirely to state con-
trol, and not so 'intimately blended and inter-
twined with responsibilities of the national gov-
ernment that its nature alone raises an inference 
of exclusion.' Pre-emption was implied only be-
cause of the 'potentialities of conflict' inherent 
where the federal and state governments both 
took hold of the same relationship. Where the 
National Board as in the Bethelhem case, had 
affirmatively asserted jurisdiction, the Court 
could not 'deal with this as a case where federal 
power has been delegated but lies dormant and 
unexercised." 
As was stated in the case of United Construction 
Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., supra: 
"* * * The care we took in the Garner Case to 
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demonstrate the existing conflict between state 
and federal administrative remedies in that case 
was, itself, a recognition that if no conflict had 
existed, the state procedure would have survived." 
Applying the above reasoning the New York Labor 
Board, in Raisch Motors v. New York S.L.R.B. (1955), 
35 L.R.R.M. 1631, took jurisdiction of a case after the 
National Labor Relations Board had declined jurisdic-
tion. The New York Board stated : 
"There is here no potential conflict, for there 
is no due claim or assertion of jurisdiction. Thus 
there is nothing which bars the application of 
state power to take labor disputes over which 
the National Board as here declines to assert 
jurisdiction." 
The New York Board urged: 
"Where the National Board refuses to assert 
jurisdiction, labor disputes must be subject to 
regulation by the states, or they will not be reg-
ulated at all. Labor disputes may or may not 
substantially affect interstate commerce, but they 
invariably have an immediate and direct impact 
upon the local community in which they occur. We 
do not believe that Congress which granted the 
National Board discretionary power to decline 
jurisdiction ever intended to prevent the states, 
when that occurs, from taking necessary steps to 
protect their own safety, health and welfare." 
Although not cited by appellants, we are aware of 
the case of State v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 120 Utah 
294, 233 P. 2d 685, decided by this Court in 1951. We 
are in accord with the reasoning and result in that de-
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cision and mention it only to distinguish the issue there 
presented. The Montgomery Ward case involved a con-
flict between the United States Labor l\ianagement Re-
lations Act and the Utah statute, authorizing wage check-
offs,-differing from the problem in this instance where 
there is neither an irreconcilable conflict or even a po-
tential conflict between a federal and state statute or 
federal and state action. The Montgomery Ward con-
clusion is therefore not applicable here. 
In Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. New York Labor 
Relations B oardJ supra, the court held: 
"When federal administrative regulation 
has been slight under a statute which potentially 
allows minute and multitudinous regulations of 
its subject, cf. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. 
Georgia, 234 US 280, 58 L. Ed. 1312, 34 S. Ct. 
829, or even where extensive regulations have 
been made, if the measure in question relates to 
what may be considered a separable or distinct 
segment of the matter covered by the federal 
statute and the federal agency has not acted on 
that segment, the case will be treated in a manner 
similar to cases in which the effectiveness of 
federal supervision awaits federal administrative 
regulation, Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co. v. Neb-
raska State R. Commission, 297 US 471, 80 L. 
Ed. 810, 56 S. Ct. 536, supra; H. P. Welch Co. v. 
New Hampshire, 306 US 79, 83 L. Ed. 500, 59 
S. Ct. 438, supra. The states are in those cases 
permitted to use their police power in the inter-
val. Terminal R. )Asso. v. ,Brotherhood of R. 
Trainmen, 318 US 1, 87 L. Ed. 571, 63 S. Ct. 420." 
In view of the above authorities it would seem, a fortiori, 
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that where a federal agency has affirmatively declined 
jurisdiction over a l~bor matter, the arguments for al-
lowing state action would be even more convincing than 
in the case where the federal administrative action 
might have been taken, but was not. Whe~ffirmative 
declination is made, it is certain that the Federal Gov-
ernment does not intend to occupy the area in question. 
It has been held that if the Federal Government, 
through 'Congress, has occupied a given field of regula-
tion, a state may nonetheless exercise control until the 
agency charged with enforcing. the federal regulations 
acts to enforce its authority or jurisdiction thereunder. 
As was stated in the case Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Larabee 
Flour Mills, 211 U.S. 612 (1909): 
"In other words, the mere grant by Congress 
to the commission of certain national powers in 
respect to interstate commerce does not of itself 
and in the absence of action by the commission 
interfere with the authority of the state to make 
those regulations conducive to the welfare and 
convenience of its citizens. Running through the 
entire argument of counsel for the Missouri 
Pacific is the thought that the control of Con-
gress over interstate commerce and a delegation 
of that control to a commission necessarily with-
draws from the State all power in respect to 
regulations of a local character. This proposition 
cannot be sustained. Until specific action by Con-
gress or the commission the control of the State 
over these incidental matters remains undisturb-
ed." 
See also Termifnal R.R. Ass'n v. Brotherhood of R.R. 
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Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943); H. P. Welch Co. v. New 
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939); Northwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co. v. Nebraska Ry. Comm'n., 297 lJ.S. 471 (1936), 
and cited therein; M-L-T Ry. v. Harris, 234 U.S. 412 
(1914); Preston, "Federal 'Pre-Emption' in Labor Rela-
tions, - A Reply to Professor Cox," 36 Chi. Bar Record 
121 (Dec. 1954); "Labor Law-Federal-State Jurisdic-
tion-A Pre-Emption Question," 27 Rocky Mountain 
Law Review 330. 
In view of the above authority, it is submitted that 
action by an administrative agency, in effect, amounts 
to action by Congress where Congress has empowered, 
but not directed the N.L.R.B. to act in cases affecting 
commerce. The National Labor Relations Board in 
promulgating its juriHdictional yardsticks, therefore, has 
marked the extent of congressional jurisdiction in that 
area. The boards' standards should be given the same 
effect in defining the limited area to be covered by the 
federal statute as they would have been accorded had 
they been included in the federal act at the time of its 
enactment. 
Respondents are aware of the fact that decisions 
of administrative agencies do not have the stature efrr./ 
force of law that holdings of judicial tribunals are ac-
corded. Nevertheless, very often the practical problems 
that arise before federal and state agencies present 
complex situations 'vhich that body has become skilled in 
handling through its experience and constant attention 
in a given field. For this reason we have included in our 
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brief citations from state labor boards and the remarks 
of federal and state labor board personnel. 
In order to prevent the creation of a "no man's 
land," the New York Labor Board and the Wisconsin 
Board have recently taken cases affecting interstate 
comn1erce following the National Labor Relations Board's 
declination to assert its jurisdiction. See Raisch Motors 
v. N.Y.S.L.R.B., supra. 
The Wisconsin Board, 1n Copper v. Utter, 34 
L.L.R.M. 1287, decided May 24, 1954, on the basis of the 
Kinard case, supra, stated: 
"Thus since the highest jurisdictional author-
ity has not determined that state action would be 
futile in the event the National Labor Relations 
Board has refused to exercise jurisdiction, we 
have therefore directed a representation election." 
It is significant to point out that in N.Y.S.L.R.B. v. 
Wags Transportation System, 130 N.Y. Supp. 2d 721, 
cited by appellants, the affirmance of the lo"\\""er court's 
denial of enforcement was on the limited ground that 
there was no clear showing in that case that the National 
Board would have rejected jurisdiction. Even in view 
of the Wags decision, the Raisch Motors ruling by the 
New York State Labor Board stands. 
The National Labor Relations Board general coun-
sel has asserted : 
"In practice the board never has, and I think 
I can confidently predict it never will interfere 
to block state action in a situation where the board 
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chooses to stay its hand because it believes the 
impact of the activity on commerce would be in-
substantial/' 
* * * * 
"Once it is recognized that Congress has 
authorized the board at its discretion to with-
hold the full exercise of its jurisdiction, I can-
not see any consideration of policy which makes 
it necessary or desirable to exclude the states 
from any field that the board properly abnegates 
in this way." 
(See address by N.L.R.B. General Counsel, George J. 
Bott, May 13, 1954, cited in 34 L.R.R. pages 67-68.) 
In the recent case of Weber v. Anheuser Bush, 99 
L. Ed. 386, ______ U.S. ______ , Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writ-
ing the majority decision for an unanimous court, said, 
in describing the ruling of the LaCrosse case (cited by 
appellant) : 
"The Federal Board's machinery for dealing 
with certification problems also carries implica-
tions of exclusiveness, thus a State may not certify 
a Union as the collective bargaining agent for 
employees, where the Federal Board, if called 
upon, would use its own certification procedure." 
(E.mphasis added.) 
While the Supreme Court does not answer the proposi-
tion squarely, respondents contend that the Weber hold-
ing gives an indication that probably the Supreme Court 
will allow a state board to act if the National Labor Re-
lations Board does not act. 
State labor boards stand ready and willing to handle 
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matters over which the National Labor Relations Board 
has declined jurisdiction. In an address before the New 
York State Federation of Labor, July 21, 1954, Jay 
Kramer, Chairman of theN ew York Labor Board, stated: 
"The relinquishment of jurisdiction by the 
National Labor Relations Board * * * has vastly 
expanded the sphere. of usefulness of the State 
Labor Relations Board * * * . You should lmow 
that this board stands ready and eager to handle 
that increased case load and that we are prepared 
to extend and maintain our contribution to col-
lective bargaining, industrial peace and indus-
trial growth in the Empire State." 
(See 34 L.R.R. 261) 
POINT· III 
UNLESS THE STATE ACTS IN THIS INSTANCE, A 
VACUUM IN THE LAW IS CREATED WHICH MAY RE-
SULT IN ACTIVITIES PROHIBITED BY BOTH STATE 
AND FEDERAL LAW. 
Respondents are aware of the case of Retail Clerks 
Local No. 1564 v. Your Food Stores, 225 F. 2d 659, 
(1955), cited by appellants. With the results of that 
decision we cannot agree, for to accept the conclusion 
therein would be to perpetuate a vacuum in the field of 
labor relations over which no legal authority would have 
jurisdiction. 
It would seem paradoxical to hold that because the 
National Labor Relations Board once held an election 
in the case before us, the Union is beyond the control of 
the Utah State Labor Relations Board, because follow-
ing that election the National Labor Relations Board 
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declined to assert jurisdiction on the grounds that the 
employer's business was predominantly local in char-
acter and would not add up to the standards necessary 
to meet the National Board's test for invoking jurisdic-
tion. 
By its ruling on July 21, 1954, in declining the in-
stant case, the National Labor Relations Board in effect 
held that the employer's business impact on interstate 
commerce is so trivial as to warrant leaving disputes 
like it to local or state control. 
While many management or labor groups might 
argue the virtue of appellant's position, thereby pur-
posely creating a "vacuum" in labor activities, the union 
involved here prefers that all areas of labor-manage-
ment relations be governed by rules of law and order. 
To accept appellant's argument is to concede that under 
the circumstances that were clearly demonstrated in 
this case, a "no-man's land" must exist at a state level, 
because the National Board refuses to act. Labor rela-
tions and industrial peace cannot exist in a void and 
should not be governed by rules of the "jungle." A state's 
failure to exercise iis jurisdiction might result in labor-
management activities, in the future, not regulated by 
federal law, nevertheless prohibited by state law, that 
would bar state enforcement and permit a climate of 
industrial relations that runs contrary to all public 
policy. 
Conceivably either management or labor might from 
time to time gain by the creation of a void in the labor 
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field, but neither side could be totally immune from di-
rect injury. The sword would cut both ways. But whether 
management or labor could better its position in a "no-
man's" situation is of course of secondary importance. 
Ultimate injury to the community must of necessity be 
the primary concern. Public welfare, health and safety 
have every thing to gain by an application of law and 
order in this instance. The creation and perpetuation 
of a labor relations "no-man's land" could produce no-
thing less than retrogression in the field of labor rela-
tions, with the resultant har1n reflected in the lives and 
progress of a community. 
It is inconceivable that the National Congress in-
tended that a vacuum should result from an application 
of federal labor legislation. 
Respondents seek the Court's indulgence in sum-
marizing its position by referring to a portion of an 
article appearing in 50 North Western Law Review 190 
(1955). A symposium, dealing with "National Labor 
Relations Board Jurisdictional Standards and State 
Jurisdiction" made the following lengthy, but convinc-
ing appraisal as follows: 
"In light of the preemptive trend of the law 
in this area, questions have naturally arisen as 
to what rights, if any, the states now possess in 
this 'tidelands' area which extends from the 
farthest reach of the Board's power under the 
Commerce Clause (the constitutional limitation) 
inward to the new line drawn by the Board's 
most recent, self-imposed jurisdictional 'yard-
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sticks' (the discretionary limitation). Must 
it be assumed that where there has been a removal 
of state power because of the pree1nptive effect 
of the national act, followed by a refusal of the 
National Board to exercise a part of this result-
ing power, it is necessary that a formal cession 
agreement (the only express method of returning 
power to the states recognized by the federal 
act) be executed as a condition precedent to any 
state agency stepping into the unoccupied area 
thus created~ Or, to put it negatively, when the 
National Board declines to exercise its exclusive 
jurisdiction to any and, at the same time, has 
not formally ceded its jurisdiction to any state 
agency, is a 'no man's land' created wherein the 
federal government will not act and the state 
governments cannot act~ 
"The Supreme Court, although it has taken 
notice of the problem, has expressly reserved 
judgment until such time as the issue is squarely 
presented to it. 
"Should the Court eventually be required to 
resolve the question, it would appear that implica-
tions arising from the express statutory provi-
sion for cession agreements would be the most 
difficult obstacle for the proponents of state 
power to overcome. Undoubtedly, it would be 
persuasively argued that this statutory enactment 
withdrew from the National Board any power to 
cede jurisdiction to the states on its o"\vn terms, 
substituting therefor the rigid express cession 
agreement provisions of the act. Thus it could 
be contended that if the Board, be merely declin-
ing to assert jurisdiction, could pave the way for 
state action, the statutory requirement would be 
rendered meaningless. Moreover, advocates of 
complete federal preemption might justify the 
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pjossibility of a resultant 'no man's land' by argu-
ing that Congress was attempting to force the 
adoption of state laws patterned after the na-
tional act and thus intentionally made conformity 
the price which the states must pay if they wish 
to take jurisdiction over disputes in the 'tide-
lands' area. 
"However, the stronger arguments appear to 
be on the side of those favoring state power. 
Logically, it u·ottld seem that the statutory pro-
vision for cession agreements was intended to 
apply only in those areas where the Board does 
consistently assert jurisdiction, but where a quali-, 
fied state agency, operating under labor legis-
lation identical to the national act, is available 
to assume a part of t~he burden. Only in that 
situation, where the federal government clearly 
wishes to have policies consonant with the na-
tional act applied, is the cession agreement neces-
sary in order to avoid conflict and assure uni-
formity. In addition, it would appear that the 
preemptive rationale of the Bethlehem, LaCrosse 
and Garner cases, based as it is upon the fear of 
potential conflict where there is concurrent juris-
diction, is also only applicable in those cases 
where the National Board will assert its power 
and does not extend to those disputes over which 
the Board has said it will refuse jurisdiction. 
"In the latter situations, there is no pos-
sibility of dual assertion of jurisdiction and hence 
no danger of conflicting results. 
"In addition, the following more general 
arguments can be advanced as reasons for per-
mitting state action: 
"(1) The NLRA is based upon the federal 
power to regulate interstate commerce. The Su-
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preme Court, in construing statutes enacted un-
der the Commerce Clause, has stated that it will 
find no suspension of the exercise of the reserve 
powers of a state except so far as the Congres-
sional intent to do so is clearly manifested. Since 
there appears to be no clear manifestation of 
Congressional will to prohibit the exercise of state 
authority in the 'tidelands' area, the states should 
be permitted to assert jurisdiction. 
"(2) The Supreme Court has held that in 
cases where federal administrative regulation is 
slight, but extensive regulation would be aible, 
or where regulation is more detailed, the 
federal agency has not acted in regard to a separ-
able segment of the area covered by the federal 
statute, the states may step in and exercise their 
powers. If the Court will permit the states to 
absorb the vacuum in these situations, there 
would seem to be an even clearer case for the 
exercise of state power where the federal agency 
(the National Board here) has not only failed 
to act but has expressly stated that it will not 
act in regard to a distinct and separable segment 
of the area covered by the federal act, such as 
that created as a result of the Board's new juris-
dictional policies. 
"(3) Congress, in its original legislation in 
this area, could have occupied only a limited area, 
thereby leaving local and borderline cases to 
state regulation. Rather than directly exercise 
this line-drawing power, however, Congress left 
it to the Board in the form of a statutory provi-
sion empowering, but not directing the Board to 
act in cases affecting commerce. Thus, the N a-
tiona! Board, in exercising this discretion, is 
actually filling in the details of the Congressional 
policy. The Board's jurisdictional standards 
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should therefore be accorded the sanae effect, in 
thus naarking off the linaited area to be covered 
by the federal act, that they would have received 
had they been included in the federal act at the 
time of its passage. 
"It thus appears that the various legal argu-
ments available weigh heavily in favor of the 
exercise of state power in the 'tidelands' area. 
Moreover, policy considerations would seem to 
motivate against the creation of a 'no man's land' 
wherein labor disputes, not of sufficient impor-
tance to warrant National Board attention, but 
nonetheless a source of real concern to the com-
munities in which they occur, would be totally un-
regulated. It would therefore appear that should 
this important question reach the Suprenae Court, 
a decision favoring the assertion of state powers 
could probably be anticipated." (Enaphasis add-
ed.) 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing argument and authority, 
respondents urge that this Court affirm the Utah State 
Labor Relations Board's order in full, naake such other 
appropriate order as will enforce the board's decree, 
and grant such further relief as is just under the prem-
Ises. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
RAYMOND W. GEE 
Assistant Attorney General 
A. W. SANDACK 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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